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Abstract
Past theory and research view reciprocal resource sharing as a fundamental building block of human societies. Most studies
of reciprocity dynamics have focused on trading among individuals in laboratory settings. But if motivations to engage in
these patterns of resource sharing are powerful, then we should observe forms of reciprocity even in highly structured
group environments in which reciprocity does not clearly serve individual or group interests. To this end, we investigated
whether patterns of reciprocity might emerge among teammates in professional basketball games. Using data from logs of
National Basketball Association (NBA) games of the 2008–9 season, we estimated a series of conditional logistic regression
models to test the impact of different factors on the probability that a given player would assist another player in scoring a
basket. Our analysis found evidence for a direct reciprocity effect in which players who had ‘‘received’’ assists in the past
tended to subsequently reciprocate their benefactors. Further, this tendency was time-dependent, with the probability of
repayment highest soon after receiving an assist and declining as game time passed. We found no evidence for generalized
reciprocity – a tendency to ‘‘pay forward’’ assists – and only very limited evidence for indirect reciprocity – a tendency to
reward players who had sent others many assists. These findings highlight the power of reciprocity to shape human
behavior, even in a setting characterized by extensive planning, division of labor, quick decision-making, and a focus on
inter-group competition.
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Introduction
Reciprocity refers to various patterns by which individuals
exchange favors, support, goods, or other valued resources. Past
research has identified various forms of reciprocity, including
direct [1], indirect [2], and generalized [3]. Social scientists have
theorized that these forms of reciprocity create patterns of social
interaction and provide fundamental building blocks for social
institutions [4,5]. Reciprocity dynamics recur commonly and,
have been observed in field settings such as business negotiations
[6], the production of open-source software [7], marital partner
exchange in indigenous societies [8], and spontaneous truces
among soldiers at war [9]. Among nonhuman animals, reciprocity
dynamics have been observed in various species, for example
direct reciprocity in stickleback fish [10], indirect reciprocity
among male song sparrows [11], and generalized reciprocity in
rats [12]. Perhaps in part because reciprocity is observed across
diverse species, evolutionary theorists have advanced models of
how direct [13], indirect [2], and generalized reciprocity [14]
could each have emerged as a result of evolutionary processes.
While past research suggests that fundamental motivations lead
humans to engage in direct reciprocity, and perhaps also indirect
and generalized reciprocity, few studies have explored whether
patterns of reciprocity might help explain behavior in highly-
structured group settings where resource sharing is largely a
product of planning, strategy, and division of labor. However, such
organizational contexts are both ubiquitous and socially signifi-
cant. Further, documenting reciprocity in a setting such as this –
where reciprocity is neither readily apparent nor explicit, and
where benefits of reciprocity are not clearly evident for either the
individual or group – would offer more convincing evidence that
engagement in these forms of behavior is in fact based in strong
motivations.
To this end, we investigate whether patterns of passing in
professional basketball games exhibit the same patterns of
reciprocity found with other resource sharing. One might
reasonably wonder whether reciprocity plays any role at all in
this domain, as passing in professional basketball games is heavily
structured as a result of carefully planned strategy and an explicit
division of labor on the court prescribing who passes to whom.
Further, passing to someone on the basis of past passing patterns,
rather than an assessment of what is the most productive pass to
make in a given situation, does not clearly benefit either the player
or team. Nonetheless, given theory and research suggesting the
fundamental nature of reciprocity, it is possible that these
dynamics in fact structure passing behavior, producing hidden
patterns that would not be immediately observable without
systematic analysis. Below we present each form of reciprocity,
identifying the type of resource exchange it describes, and
highlighting the social psychological mechanisms thought to drive
it.
Direct reciprocity involves an actor, A, repaying B for benefits
received from him/her in the past. This pattern of reciprocal
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resource sharing is depicted in Figure 1a. A variety of social
psychological mechanisms have been invoked to explain direct
reciprocity. Social norms may lead individuals to engage in direct
reciprocity because they wish to behave in appropriate ways, fear
reputation loss, or wish to avoid social sanctions [1]. The
expectation of future interaction with another individual may also
stimulate direct reciprocity as a way to build and sustain a
mutually beneficial, productive relationship [9]. Finally, the
emotional experience of gratitude, felt upon receipt of a favor or
gift, can also compel individuals to reciprocate good turns [15].
Indirect reciprocity occurs when a benefactor is rewarded by
third parties for behaving generously towards others, i.e., when A
rewards B for having given to some third party, C, in the past. This
pattern is depicted in Figure 1b. The prospect of indirect
reciprocity encourages individuals to behave in generous ways in
their social relations, as their prosocial behavior may come to be
known and rewarded by other group members [16]. Researchers
have argued that generous acts lead individuals to be seen as
sincerely motivated to benefit others, a motivation that tends to be
respected by others, leading people to preferentially accord status
and allocate resources to more generous individuals [17,18].
Generalized reciprocity involves A repaying benefits to B that A
received from some third party, C, in the past. This pattern is
portrayed in Figure 1c. In popular vernacular, generalized
reciprocity is often referred to as ‘‘paying it forward,’’ a pattern
of resource sharing in which generosity is in a sense contagious,
with individuals who receive generosity being more likely to
behave generously in future interactions. Theorists have argued
that the psychology underlying generalized reciprocity may
overlap with that underlying direct reciprocity [19]. Individuals
who benefit from another person’s generosity experience grati-
tude, and that emotion motivates them to subsequently behave
more generously towards third parties [15].
Empirical overview
Passing in basketball can be viewed as a form of resource
sharing and thus might reasonably be subject to the same causal
forces shaping exchange in other settings. Thus, in the present
study we investigate whether these three fundamental forms of
reciprocity identified by past research might help explain patterns
of passing in professional basketball games.
Unfortunately total passing data is not available for NBA
basketball games. As a result, here we study patterns of assists,
passes determined to lead directly to a made basket. Note that this
provides an imperfect measure of passing behavior, however there
is some reason to think that assists might offer better insight on
reciprocity dynamics in this context. One justification of this
measure lies in the fact that assists are especially valuable passes, as
they lead directly to scoring which benefits the individual and
team. Thus, there is reason to think that assists are more likely to
be viewed by players as the sort of ‘‘valued resources’’ that forms of
reciprocity apply to. As a result, ‘‘receiving’’ assists should feel like
receiving valued rewards, more than receiving other passes. In
addition, there is good reason to think that players often know that
a pass is likely to lead to a scoring opportunity, such as passes to
players who are undefended or nearer to the hoop. Thus, it is also
likely that benefactors perceive that ‘‘giving’’ assists entails greater
value than making other sorts of passes.
For each assist, we know, 1) who has given and who has
received the assist, and 2) the exact game time of the event. These
data allow us to test the following hypotheses:
Direct reciprocity hypothesis: A focal player, A, will be more likely to
give an assist to another player, B, if A has received assists from
player B in the past.
Indirect reciprocity hypothesis: A focal player, A, will be more likely
to give an assist to another player, B, if B has given assists to some
other players, C, in the past.
Generalized reciprocity hypothesis: A focal player, A, will be more
likely to give an assist to another player, B, if A has received assists
from some other players, C, in the past.
Materials and Methods
In order to test our hypotheses, we analyzed assists occurring in
the 2008–09 NBA season, using data published at http://www.
basketballgeek.com and www.dougstats.com. The latter provided
season-wide statistics for each player while the former provided
play-by-play accounts for more than 1,000 games of the season,
including time-stamped records of all assisted baskets. In our
reduced dataset, each assist was represented by a set of four player
dyads. The dyads included the player who gave the assist, paired
with each of the four other players on the floor at the time. A dyad
was coded as ‘‘1’’ if an assist occurred between the two players and
‘‘0’’ otherwise. In all, the dataset included 170,756 such dyads. In
what follows, we refer to the player giving the assist as ‘‘player A’’
and the potential recipients as ‘‘player B.’’
We analyzed the data using conditional logistic regression
models. Conditional logistic regression models are appropriate for
Figure 1. Types of reciprocity in assists. The first panel illustrates
direct reciprocity between players A and B. The second panel illustrates
indirect reciprocity from focal player A to B, for player B’s previous assist
to C. The third panel illustrates generalized reciprocity from player A to
B, paying forward player C’s previous assist to A.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049807.g001
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predicting the choice among a set of alternatives as a function of
different attributes of the choice set [20]. In this case, we were
interested in predicting which player on the floor would be the
recipient of a given assist and analyzing whether the choice of a
particular player was influenced by reciprocity considerations.
Formally, the model is specified as:
Pr(yi~mDzi)~
exp(zimc)
PJ
j~1 exp(zijc)
where yi refers to individual i’s choice, m refers to a particular
outcome that could be selected, zi refers to a set of predictor
variables, and c refers to the estimated coefficients associated with
each predictor variable.
Coefficients estimated from this model refer to the effect of a
unit change in the independent variable on the log odds that
player A will choose a particular player B, rather than other
potential recipients of an assist.
Independent variables
Test of direct reciprocity. The key independent variable in
this analysis was a count of the number of assists A had received
from another player, B, but had not yet repaid; i.e., the number of
assists A had received from B to that point in the game, minus the
number of assists A had given to B. We experimented with
different versions of this variable (e.g., a binary measure rather
than a continuous metric) but ultimately decided to use the
continuous variable because models using this variable fit the data
best according to BIC statistics. Because the motivation to
reciprocate likely attenuates over time [1], we also interacted the
main reciprocity variable with the (logged) number of minutes that
player A and player B have been on the floor together since player
B last gave A an assist. In cases where player B has never assisted
player A, we used the number of minutes that the two have been
on the floor together until the current point in the game. We
predicted a negative interaction between our indicator of a
reciprocation opportunity and this time variable, consistent with
the idea that the desire to repay a favor is strongest immediately
after receiving something and weakens over time.
Test of indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity corre-
sponds to the desire to help someone who has exhibited helping
behavior toward others in the past. In this context, if a focal player
were motivated by indirect reciprocity, he would be more likely to
assist a player who had frequently assisted others, even if that
player had not assisted the focal player. Accordingly, we measured
drivers of indirect reciprocity with a count of how many assists
player B had given to others, not including A. We also interacted
this with the (logged) number of minutes player A and player B
had been on the floor together since player B last assisted a player
other than A. If player B had never assisted anyone or had never
assisted anyone other than player A, we included the total amount
of time A and B had been on the floor together to that point in the
game.
Test of generalized reciprocity. Generalized reciprocity
represents the idea that a person may be motivated to give to
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Analysis of Assist Behavior.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Player B Characteristics*
Mins. on Court in Current Game with Player A 9.90 7.82 0.02 43.05
Center 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Power Forward 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Small Forward 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Point Guard 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Shooting Guard 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Shots Made/Attempt (Season Avg. %) 0.45 0.59 0.00 1.00
Shots Attempted Per Game (Season Avg.) 11.71 5.65 0.05 25.75
Log Minutes Played Per Game (Season Avg.) 3.27 0.36 0.52 3.68
Assists Per Game (Season Avg.) 7.83 5.20 0.00 32.30
Points Per Game (Season Avg.) 12.06 6.01 0.00 30.20
Shots Made (Current Game) 2.32 2.36 0.00 20.00
Shots Attempted (Current Game) 4.85 4.34 0.00 31.00
Minutes on Court (Current Game) 14.13 9.82 0.03 47.25
Direct Reciprocity Drivers
Number of Assists Player A Owes to B 0.15 0.46 0.00 7.00
Log Minutes on Court Together Since B Last Assisted A 1.75 1.07 24.09 3.76
Indirect Reciprocity Drivers
Number of Assists from B to Anyone Besides A 0.99 1.48 0 18.00
Log Minutes on Court Together Since B Assisted Anyone Besides A 1.34 1.08 24.09 3.75
Generalized Reciprocity Drivers
Number of Assists from Anyone Besides B to A 1.00 1.31 0 13.00
Log Minutes on Court Together Since Anyone Besides B Assisted A 1.33 1.07 24.09 3.70
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049807.t001
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others if he or she has received favors in the past, even if he does
not give back directly to those who have given to him or her. To
test for generalized reciprocity, we counted how many assists A
had received from everyone on the floor, excluding B. Similar to
our time-based interaction terms for direct and indirect reciproc-
ity, we included a variable to measure the time that A and B had
been on the court together since A last received an assist from
anyone besides B.
Control variables. We controlled for a variety of factors that
might cause a player to be chosen as the recipient of an assist more
frequently than others. In order to capture the fact that a player’s
position is a major driver of the role he plays on the team with
respect to assisting behavior, we included indicators for B’s
position (dummies for center, power forward, small forward and
point guard). We also controlled for player B’s field goal
percentage (shots made per attempt), assists per game, shots
attempted per game, and points per game for the 2008–9 season.
We included the average number of minutes played per game
(logged) by player B. To capture the idea that players who are
perceived as having a ‘‘hot hand’’ might tend to receive more
assists, we controlled for the number of shots player B had made so
far in the current game. To account for the possibility that players
Table 2. Estimated Coefficients from Conditional Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Recipient of an Assist, Direct
Reciprocity.
(1) (2) (3)
Min. on Court in Game w/Player A 20.006 20.006 20.021*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Center 20.019 20.019 20.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Power Forward 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.127***
(0.019) (.019) (0.019)
Small Forward 0.031 0.031 0.031
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Point Guard 20.038 20.038 20.037
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Shots Made/Attempt (Season Avg. %) 1.581*** 1.581*** 1.575***
(0.160) (0.160) (0.160)
Shots Attempted Per Game (Season Avg.) 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Min. Played Per Game (Season Avg.) 20.224*** 20.224*** 20.238***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Assists Per Game (Season Avg.) 20.013*** 20.014*** 20.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Points Per Game (Season Avg.) 20.002 20.002 20.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Shots Made in Current Game 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Shots Attempted in Current Game 20.000 20.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Minutes on Court in Current Game 20.007*** 20.007*** 20.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(1) Number of Assists Player A owes B 0.001 0.101***
(0.013) (0.027)
(2) Log Minutes on Court Together 0.075***
Since B Last Assisted A (0.014)
(1) X (2) 20.035**
(0.013)
Wald Chi-Squared 1746*** 1747*** 1779***
Degrees of Freedom 48 49 51
Note: Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Assists. All models include controls for team and Player A factors, as described in Data & Methods section (results are not
reported for brevity). N= 170,756 Player A-Player B Dyads;
*p,.05,
**p,.01,
***p,.001. All tests two-tailed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049807.t002
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might ‘‘take turns,’’ tending to pass to those who had not recently
had an opportunity to take a shot, we also controlled for the
number of shots player B had attempted in the current game. We
also controlled for the number of minutes player A and player B
had been on the court together to that point in the current game.
We also controlled for player A’s position, average minutes
played per game (logged), and average assists per game for the
Table 3. Estimated Coefficients from Conditional Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Recipient of an Assist, Indirect and
Generalized Reciprocity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Min. on Court in Game w/Player A 20.006 20.009 20.006 20.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Center 20.019 20.020 20.019 20.018
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Power Forward 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Small Forward 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Point Guard 20.038 20.038 20.038 20.038
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Shots Made/Attempt (Season Avg. %) 1.578*** 1.571*** 1.579*** 1.578***
(0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160)
Shots Attempted Per Game (Season Avg.) 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Min. Played Per Game (Season Avg.) 20.222*** 20.226*** 20.224*** 20.227***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Assists Per Game (Season Avg.) 20.014*** 20.014*** 20.014*** 20.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Points Per Game (Season Avg.) 20.002 20.002 20.002 20.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Shots Made in Current Game 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Shots Attempted in Current Game 20.000 20.000 20.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Minutes on Court in Current Game 20.008*** 20.008*** 20.007*** 20.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(3) Number of Assists from B to 0.006 0.018*
Anyone Besides A (0.005) (0.007)
(4) Log Minutes on Court Together 0.022*
Since B Last Assisted A (0.009)
(3) X (4) 20.005
(0.004)
(5) Number of Assists from Anyone 20.014 20.022
Besides B to A (0.012) (0.034)
(6) Log Minutes on Court Together 0.038**
Since Anyone Besides B Assisted A (0.012)
(5) X (6) 0.005
(0.006)
Wald Chi-Squared 1747*** 1753*** 1748*** 1767***
Degrees of Freedom 49 51 49 51
Note: Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Assists. All models include controls for team and Player A factors, as described in Data & Methods section (results are not
reported for brevity). N= 170,756 Player A-Player B Dyads;
*p,.05,
**p,.01,
***p,.001. All tests two-tailed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049807.t003
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2008–9 season. Because these characteristics of player A do not
vary within a possession, we are unable to estimate their effects by
including them in the model as is. As a result, in order to ensure
variation on these variables within a given possession, we chose to
interact player A’s characteristics with the number of minutes A
and B have overlapped on the court so far in the current game.
Finally, we accounted for possible differences in teams’ strategies
with respect to assists by including team indicator variables, again
interacted with the number of minutes A and B have overlapped
on the floor until the current point in the game. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
Results
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients from conditional
logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of a particular
player getting an assist. Model 1 includes control variables. Most
control variables operate as expected. Not surprisingly, a player is
much more likely to be selected as the recipient of an assist if his
field goal percentage is high (b=1.581, p,.001). Moreover, the
greater a player’s average shots attempted per game for the season,
the more likely he is to receive an assist (b=0.051, p,.001).
In model 2, we tested for direct reciprocity by including the
count of how many assists player A ‘‘owes’’ player B. This variable
is not significant. However, the results of model 3 provide evidence
of a direct reciprocity effect once we account for the fact that the
motivation to reciprocate is likely to decline over time. Model 3
includes the interaction of the count of assists owed and the
(logged) time since B last assisted A. Conditional on giving an assist
to anyone, for each additional assist received from B that has not
yet been repaid, odds are 10.6% (e0.10121) higher that player A
will assist player B. The negative interaction term indicates that
this effect diminishes over time, consistent with our expectation.
Table 3 presents results of tests for indirect and generalized
reciprocity. In model 1, we added a variable that captures the total
number of assists player B has given to others besides A. This term
was not significantly related to A’s likelihood of assisting B in this
model. Model 2 includes the interaction of the count of assists
given by B to others besides A and the (logged) number of minutes
since player B last assisted someone besides A. In this model the
time since B assisted someone else and the count of assists by B
were both positively related to A’s likelihood of assisting B,
however the interaction of these terms was not. Given that the
effect of B’s past assisting behavior to others besides A only
affected A’s likelihood of assisting B in this latter model, and the
effect did not interact with the time since the last assist B had given
to another teammate as would be expected, we conclude that these
results do not support the existence of indirect reciprocity in this
setting.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 3 test for generalized reciprocity by
including the number of assists player A has received from anyone
besides player B. We interacted this variable with the time player
A and B have been on the court together since A last received an
assist from someone other than B. Neither of these terms was
significant. Note, however, that it would be difficult for us to find
strong evidence for both direct and generalized reciprocity using
our analytic approach in this setting. It is possible that both assists
earned from B in the past and players besides B could both
additively contribute to A’s likelihood of assisting B, relative to
other teammates (the predictions of our direct and generalized
reciprocity hypotheses). However, the stronger A’s motivation is to
engage in direct reciprocity, the less likely we would be to observe
that A will select B from among his teammates to assist after
receiving assists from teammates besides B, since a strong direct
reciprocity motivation would lead A to reciprocate those other
teammates directly.
Discussion
Overall, the results of our analyses suggest that reciprocity is
responsible for some passing behavior among NBA players. We
found evidence for direct reciprocity as a factor in the choice of
whom a player was likely to assist. Individuals were more likely to
assist another player who had assisted them in the past. Further,
this effect was strongest soon after the original assist. The effect of
having received an assist on the likelihood of reciprocation was
greatest immediately after an assist was received and diminished as
time passed from the receipt of the benefit, consistent with
reciprocity dynamics in other settings.
Indirect and generalized reciprocity, on the other hand, did not
seem to influence assist behavior. The lack of consistent evidence
for indirect reciprocity is perhaps not surprising. Assisting others
may often be seen as an expected behavior in this context,
especially among those players responsible for setting up the
team’s offense, like guards (who are responsible for the greatest
number of assists). Thus, being responsible for an assist may not be
seen as a strong indicator that one is generous and deserves to be
rewarded by third parties. Still, given the robustness of past
research on indirect reciprocity, the prospect that more generous
basketball players are subsequently rewarded by their teammates –
even those they did not directly benefit – deserves further
attention. The lack of evidence for generalized reciprocity may
be a product of the subtlety of this effect. While past research has
documented tendencies for people to ‘‘pay forward’’ favors
received, these effects appear to be much smaller than corre-
sponding direct reciprocity effects.
In the setting we studied, individuals tended to repay assists
received from teammates with direct reciprocity, though neither
individual nor team performance was clearly served by such
behavior. But while testimony to the power of reciprocity, our
findings cannot speak to what psychological mechanism(s) – e.g.,
internalization of cultural norms, feelings of indebtedness, a hope
that reciprocity might lead to future benefits for oneself – might
drive these effects, providing a potentially fruitful avenue for future
investigation. These findings underscore the strength of human
motivations to engage in direct reciprocity, demonstrating that it
obtains even in a setting where individual performance is highly
salient and rewarded, player roles are clearly defined, and within-
game strategy and coaching prescribes much passing behavior.
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